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it could be said that for the specialist the locality rule has been
abandoned. The principal case would appear to support this observation. Yet, the court was careful not to abrogate the locality
rule entirely. Each case must be considered on its own facts. The
court seemed to say that the locality rule applies to specialists and
general practitioners, but the definition of locality for the specialist
embraces more area." The diminishing importance of the locality
rule can be seen by one expressed view that the size and character
of the community is just one factor to be taken into account in
determining the applicable general professional standard."
The general rule as to the standard of care established for a doctor
in a medical malpractice action, imposing the requirements of the
same or similar locality, still prevails. However, with improved
communications and transportation, the area of inclusion within
a "locality" has been enlarged. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals seems fully warranted in holding that the locality to which
the standard is applied for a specialist in a medical malpractice action
in West Virginia is large enough to encompass the testimony of a
specialist from New York.
Richard Edwin Rowe

Future Interests--Transmissibility and Survivorship
Characteristics of Reminders
T died in 1908, leaving a will which devised her property to X
in trust for the benefit of A for life, and in case A should die leaving
"child or children" surviving her then to such "child or children." If
A should died without issue then to T's brothers and sisters in equal
shares, with the share of any brother or sister who died leaving
children to those children. T had eight brothers and sisters, three
of whom predeceased T, and the remaining five predeceased A,
who died without issue in 1965. The trial court found that T intended
her property to go to her brothers and sisters or their direct descendents per stirpes, without lapse, with the interests vesting at
19 This is not to say that the locality rule for the general practitioner
has not been expanded, but only that the expansion for the specialist has
been greater.
20 McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1131, 43 N.W.2d 121, 128
(1950); W. PRossER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 32 (3d ed. 1984).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 21
1968]

CASE COMMENTS

the death of A. Held, affirmed. T intended the interests in her

property to vest in her brothers and sisters and all lineal descendants
of such brothers and sisters upon the death of A without issue.
Security National Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715

(W. Va. 1968).
The court determined the primary problem to be whether the estate
of the brothers and sisters vested at the testatrix's death or the death
of the life tenant; and, whether the word "children" included only
children of the first degree or whether it could be broadened to
include grandchildren.1
The appellants, fiduciaries of deceased persons who, had they
survived the life tenant, would have been in the class of descendants
of the testatrix's brothers and sisters, contended that the "plain
language" of the will required a vesting of interests at the death
of the testatrix, and included only children of the first degree as
participants.2
The appellees, direct descendants of the testatrix's brothers and
sisters, alleged that the will indicated the testatrix's intent that both
the vesting of interests and the distribution of the estate be effected
upon the death of the life tenant.3 The appellees also contended
that until the testatrix died without issue, the brothers and sisters or
their children had "nothing but a contingency or expectancy." 4
In construing the testatrix's intent as to the vesting of interests, the
court agreed with the appellant's contention that the law favors an
early vesting of interests.' However, the court stated that this rule
should not be applied if the expressed intention of the testatrix
by words in a will or by necessary implication indicates a later
vesting.' The court considered the testatrix's use of the word "then"
in relation to gifts to the life tenant's surviving children upon her
death,7 and in relation to the gift to the brothers and sisters or their
children,8 as determinative of her intent to delay the vesting of
interests until the death of the life tenant.9 In support of this
I Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. WiUimn, 158 S.E.2d 715, 717, 720
(W. Va. 1968).
2 Id. at 718.
3

Id.

4Id.

5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 717.
8 Id.

9 Id at 719.
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decision the court stated that the brothers and sisters could not
alienate the property because legal title to the estate was in the
trustee and could be in no one else at the same time;' that the
remaindermen could not be ascertained until the death of the life
tenant;" and, that the interests of the remaindermen were a "mere
contingency" until the death of the life tenant.' 2 Relying on the case
of Kanawha Valley Bank v. Hornbeck, 3 the court concluded that
the trustee had a fee simple defeasible or qualified fee which required the interests to vest at the termination of the trust upon the
life tenant's death.
In determining the intention of the testatrix as to the participants
in the estate, the court construed the word "children" as including
within its meaning the children of the brothers and sisters and "all
lineal descendants of such brothers and sisters".' 4 The court stated
that technical words are presumed as being used technically and
should be given their strict meaning unless it appears from the will
that another meaning was intended by the testatrix.'" "Children"
primarily means children in the first degree; however, its meaning
may be "broadened" to include the grandchildren if it appears to
be the intention of the testatrix.'" The court reasoned that the
distribution of the testatrix's estate to her brothers and sisters in
equal shares and her reference to " the share of any of them"'" when
speaking of the gift to a dead brother or as going to their children,
indicated a per stirpes distribution and included the children of her
brothers and sisters, and "all lineal descendants of such brothers and
sisters."' 8 In support of this determination the court said that the
testatrix's circumstances and her intended beneficiaries at the time
of the execution of the will must be considered.' 9 The primary
beneficiary was the life tenant, an infant at the execution of the will.
The court stated that it would be unlikely that the testatrix believed
any of her brothers and sisters would survive the life tenant and that
several brothers and sisters had children.2" The court also gave
10

Id. at 720.

11 id.
12

Id.

'3

151 S.E. 2d 694 (W.Va. 1966).

'4Security

Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 721

(W. Va. 1968).
15 Id. at 720.
16
'7

Id.

Id. at 717.
at 721.

18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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weight, in regard to broadening the meaning of the word "children",
to the fact that the testatrix specifically stated in her will that the
life tenant's father was to have no control over the funds."
In determining the interests created by the will, it would seem that
a construction other than the one given by the court is possible. That
the legal title was in the trustee is unquestioned; 2 however, a
determination that the trustee's interest was a fee simple determinable
(or fee simple defeasible as referred to by the court) seems to leave
room for disagreement. A fee simple determinable is not a fee simple
absolute. 2 Rather, it is a fee terminated by operation of law upon
24
the occurrence of a condition or event set forth by the testatrix.

It is usually accompanied by such language as "until," "as long as,"
or "during."2 Since the language used did not indicate what is
normally considered a fee simple determinable, it would seem that
another construction would be possible. The legal title in the
trustee was to exist only until the termination of the trust at the
death of the life tenant; therefore, the trustee's interest might be
construed as legal title in trust for the life of the life tenant; or, an
estate pur autre vie in trust.2 '
The interest of the life tenant's children would seem to be a contingent remainder. A contingent remainder has been defined as a
remainder limited to an uncertain person, or an uncertain event; or,
so limited to a certain person and event as not to possess the present
capacity to take effect in possession.2 In the principal case, the
children of the life tenant were unborn at the creation of the interest,2 9
and had to survive the life tenant to take a vested interest;"0 thus, the
21
22
23
24

Id.

Wilson v. Kennedy, 63 W. Va. 1, 7, 59 S.E. 736, 739 (1907).
Talbot v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 851, 148 S.E. 865, 868 (1929).

Id.

Trice v. Powell, 168 Va. 397, 191 S.E. 758, 762 (1937).
Security Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va.
1968); see Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W. Va. 398, 411, 113 S.E. 256, 261
(1922). The court stated that when the purpose for which a trust was created no longer exists, title to the property goes to those who come next in
succession.
27 See State v. Matthews, 68 W. Va. 89, 94, 69 S.E. 644 (1910); IN
BLACKS LA-W DICTIONARY 1074 (4th ed. 1951) a life estate per autre vie was
defined as an estate held for the duration of the life of another. See RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY, Explanatory Notes §§ 14, 16, 18 (1936).
25 Bland v. Davisson, 77 W. Va. 557 560 88 S.E. 1021 (1916).
29 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 153 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va.
1967).
30 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 717
(W. Va. 1968). T specifically referred to the children of A as "surviving
children.'
2
26
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children's interest falls within the definition of a contingent remainder
in that the children were unascertainable and their interest limited
to a certain event.
The life tenant's interest, being beneficial for life," was an
equitable life estate. The interests of the brothers and sisters of the
testatrix were contingent upon the life tenant's death without issue,
and would have vested upon the occurrence of that event had
there been no additional provision concerning the children of the
brothers and sisters.3" Absent the provision just mentioned, there
would be no problem in finding a life estate pur autre vie in trust
for the trustee, an equitable life estate in the life tenant, alternate
contingent remainders 3 in the surviving children of the life tenant
and the brothers and sisters of the testatrix. However, the added
provision that the share of any brother or sister dying with issue
("children" in will) was to go to such issue34 created another problem
-the nature of the interest of such issue ("children" in will) and its
effect upon the interests of the brothers and sisters.
Since the brothers and sisters were to take a vested interest upon
the life tenant's death without issue,35 it would seem that the testatrix
was referring to the gift to the surviving issue ("children") of a
brother or sister who died, as only capable of occurring should the
brother or sister die leaving issue before the death of the life tenant.3 "
The contingent remainder of the brothers and sisters would therefore
be capable of defeat by his or her death, with issue surviving, prior to
31 See Rowley v. American Trust Co., 144 Va. 375, 132 S.E. 346, 347

(1926).

32 In re Conley 122 W. Va. 559, 563, 12 S.E.2d 49 (1940).
The court
stated that all texts hold that a conveyance or devise to A for life, and if he
die without children, then to B, makes B's estate contingent and does not
allow it to vest until the happening of the condition precedent -A's death
without issue.
"a Commonwealth v. Wellford, 114 Va. 372, 76 S.E. 917, 918 (1913);
Loddington v. Kime, I Salk. 224 (1695); Young v. Lewis, 138 W. Va. 425,
76 S.E.2d 276 (1953). The court in this case placed a completely different construction upon a similar devise than the court in the principal case.
In a devise to A for life, remainder in fee to M's children; if he leaves none,
remainder to T's heirs; the court construed the interests as: Qualified fee
in the heirs after A's life estate; remainder in fee to vest in A's children if any.
34 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d
715, 717
(W. Va. 1968).
a In re Conley, 122 W. Va. 559, 563, 12 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1940).
36 L. SnAs AND Smrr,
ThE LAW OF FuTuaE INTERESTS ch. 19, § 583,
25 (1956). The authors stated that in a gift to A for life, remainder to A's
children, the descendants of any deceased child to take the parents' share,
if any; if A's children die before the life tenant, survived by descendants, the
interest of that child will be defeated and his descendants take his share.
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the death of the life tenant.37 Therefore, for the interest of the
brothers and sisters to vest indefeasably in them or their representatives at the life tenant's death without issue, they would have to die
without issue prior to the life tenant or have survived her. This
seems particularly clear when it is considered that had the testatrix
not included the additional provision concerning the children of dead
brothers and sisters, the brothers and sisters would not have had
to survive the life tenant for their contingent remainders to have
vested upon the life tenant's death without issue.38 Also, a child
taking the share of a dead brother or sister of the testatrix would
not have to survive the life tenant, since the contingencies upon
which such child would take the share is only that the brother or
sister die before the life tenant and that the child be alive at such
time.39 The majority of courts will not imply conditions of survivor40
ship.
Since three of the brothers and sisters in the principal case died
before the life tenant with or without issue,4 1 the disposition of their
contingent remainders becomes very important. The construction of
the interests created in the principal case made in the previous
paragraphs is based upon a determination or assumption that the
brothers and sisters had contingent remainders at their creation.
The validity of this determination is placed in a somewhat confusing
state by the reference to such interests as "nothing but a contingency
or expectancy" in the appellee's argument;42 and, by the reference
to them as a "mere contingency" in the opinion of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.43
An expectancy has been defined as:
"Expectancy" as applied to property, is contingency as to
37
38

Id.

L. Snius Ams SMrrmr, TAE LAw OF FuruR

INTERESTS ch. 19,

§ 583,

28 (1956).

39 L. Snmrs AND SNrm, THE LAw oF FuTup INTERuzss ch. 19, 583, 27
(1956). A devise to X for life, with a remainder to his then living brothers
and sisters and the issue of any brothers and sisters who may have died leaving issue places no requirement of survival, other than survival of the ancestor, upon the issue. The facts being: X is survived by one brother; another brother dies before X leaving three children, one of whom dies before X.
The authors stated that the interests of the issue are vested immediately upon
the death of their ancestor.
40 See In re Ferry's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 776, 787, 361 P.2d 900, 903
(1961); Black v. Todd, 121 S.C. 243, 113 S.E. 793 (1922).
41 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v, Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 717
(W. Va. 1968).
42 Id. at 718.
43 Id. at 720,
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possession, that which is expected or hoped for. At most it is a
mere hope or expectation, contingent upon the will and pleasure
of the landowner, and hardly reaches the height of a property
right, much less a vested right, because where there is no
obligation there is no right. It is a possibility for which a party
may under certain circumstances properly hope.44
That the testatrix intended the devisees to have more than an
expectancy, is seemingly indicated since she specifically referred to
their interests as being shares. 5 It does not seem logical that she
would desire them to have equal shares of a mere hope.46 Assuming
that the testatrix intended the brothers and sisters to have real
contingent remainders, the nature of contingent remainders in West
Virginia may be in question. Such a question could arise from the
court's reference to the interests of the brothers and sisters as inalienable and mere contingencies.4"
At common law, a contingent remainder could not be alienated
in a normal manner.4" However, by statute and by case law,4" in
West Virginia any interest in property is alienable if it is capable of
becoming a fee simple;" and, by case law in West Virginia a contingent remainder is a real, alienable,5 ' devisable,52 descendible,53
44 Robinson v. Eagle-Pitcher Lead Co., 132 Kan. 860, 863, 297 P. 697,
698 (1931).
41 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1968).
46
In re Conley, 122 W. Va. 559, 563, 12 S.E.2d 49 (1940). In this
case the court interpreted the words "his share" as intending a remainder
after a life estate. The court said that it seemed likely that, having named
persons, the testatrix intended that they take nothing.
47 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 719, 720
(W. Va. 1968).
48 Rouss v. Rouss, 90 W. Va. 640, 651, 111 S.E. 586, 588 (1922).
The court said that at common law contingent remainders could not be alienated; however, this was due to reasons other than the person having the contingent remainder having no right or interest.
49 Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 145, 31 S.E.2d 844 (1944). W. VA.
CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 9 (Michie 1966) provides:
Any interest in or claim to real estate or personal property may be lawfully conveyed or devised. Any estate in such property may be made to
commence in futuro, by conveyance intervivos, in like manner by will,
and any estate which would be good as an executory devise or bequest,
shall be good if created by conveyance intervivos.
50 L. SImEs, FuTuRE INTERESTs 20 (2d ed. 1966).
s,Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 145, 31 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1944).
The court said that a contingent right or interest, which would ripen into
total ownership upon the occurrence of an event possible to happen, is
property and is alienable under W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 9 (Michie
1966); National Bank of Commerce of Charleston v. Wehrle, 124 W. Va. 268,
273, 20 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1942). The court said that regardless whether an
interest was an executory interest or contingent remainder, title passed on
execution and delivery of the deed; and, under W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1,
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and substantial 5 interest in property. This is true

whether the interest be legal or equitable. 6 Therefore, assuming that
the contingent remainder of any brother or sister dying without issue
prior to the life tenant's death without issue is alienable, devisible,
descendible, attachable, and substantial; it could be held by grantees,
devisees, heirs, or creditors. The interest which these persons would

hold would be subject only to those conditions present when the
interests were in the hands of the brothers and sisters. The surviving
children of any brother or sister dying before the life tenant would
have a contingent remainder dependent only upon the life tenant's
death without issue- 57 the condition of the death of a brother
and sister not leaving issue having failed to occur.
In determining the interests in the principal case, the court invoked
the cardinal rule concerning the construction of wills; the intent of
the testator controls, unless it contravenes some positive rule of
§ 9 (Michie 1966), he could dispose of that interest by will; Kidwell v.
Rogers, 103 W. Va. 272, 275, 137 S. E. 5, 6 (1927). In quoting from another
case, the court said that contingent remainders and executory interests stood
in the same position regarding transmissibility.
52 Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 145, 31 S.E.2d 844, 848 (1944).
The court referred to a contingent remainder as capable of transfer by deed
or will; Kidwell v. Rogers, 103 W. Va. 272, 276, 137 S.E. 5, 6 (1927); see
McKown v. McKown, 93 W. Va. 689, 117 S.E. 557 (1923); Rust v. Commercial Coal & Coke Co., 92 W. Va. 457, 471, 115 S.E. 406, 411 (1923);
Rouss v. Rouss, 90 W. Va. 646, 651, 111 S.E. 586, 588 (1922).
53 National Bank of Commerce of Charleston v. Wehrle, 124 W. Va. 268,
273, 20 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1942).
54 Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 145, 31 S.E.2d 844, 848 (1944).
55 Id. at 145, 847. The court held that a contin ent remainder was not
an expectancy or possibility, but was property. In Kicwellv. Rogers, 103 W.
Va. 272, 275, 137 S.E. 5, 6 (1927) the court stated that executory interests
were not mere possibilities, but substantial interests which descend by inheritance before the happening of the contingency upon which they depend. The
court also quoted another case as holding that executory interests and contingent remainders stand on the same ground regarding their transmissibility.
In Rouss v. Rouss, 90 W. Va. 640, 652, 111 S.E. 586, 588 (1922) the court
stated that even though the interest is not vested, it is a right in land. The
right does not await the happening of the contingency which will vest the
remainder and give a right of possession. It comes from the will at the death
of the testator.
56 Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 145, 31 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1944).
T's will created a trust for three sons and provided that the interest in income of one dying without issue should pass to the survivors of them. T
also provided for forfeiture upon the occurrence of certain events, among
which was bankruptcy. One son died with children; one son died without
issue; and, one son was adjudicated bankrupt. The court said that the son
who was adjudicated bankrupt had a contingent (equitable) right or interest
which upon the occurrence of an event possible to happen would ripen into
complete ownership. This interest was considered alienable by deed or will,
and capable of being reached by creditors.
57 Security Nat:I Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 719
(W. Va. 1968).
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law.5" In applying this rule, the court felt that a primary indication of
the testatrix's intent to have the interests of the devisees vest at the
death of the life tenant was her use of the word "then" in relation to
gifts to the life tenant's surviving children, and in relation to the gift
to the brothers and sisters or their children.5" This construction is
apparently in conflict with prior West Virginia decisions. In the
case of Bland v. Davisson,6 the court considered the phrase "then let
the estate be divided" as relating to the time of enjoyment and not
the time of vesting,6 using the following quotation concerning the
significance of the word "then":
Adverbs of time in a devise of a remainder, are construed to
relate merely to the time of the enjoyment of the estate, and not
to the time of the vesting in interest. 2
In Disney v. Wilson,63 a Virginia case, the court in referring to the
use of the word "then" in devises, said that it refers to the time of
possession and enjoyment and not vesting of the right of enjoyment.6 4
A discussion of the court's consideration of the inalienability of
the interests of the brothers and sisters as an indication of the
testatrix's intent to delay the vesting of such interests65 becomes moot
upon acceptance of the validity of the previous statements concerning statutory and case law in West Virginia in regard to contingent remainders.
The court's statement concerning the broadening of the word
"children" to include "grandchildren" has support in prior case
law.66 However, in relation to such construction, the significance
of the testatrix specifically denying her son-in-law any control of
the funds-other than reflecting a normal tendency of a mother-inlaw to have a less than trusting attitude toward her son-in-law is one
of an elusive character.
58 Id.
'9 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 719
(W. Va. 1968).
60 77 W. Va. 557, 559, 88 S.E. 1021, 1023 (1916).
61 Id. at 561.
62
63
64
65

Id.

190 Va. 445, 57 S.E.2d 144 (1950).

Id. at 149.

Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 158 S.E.2d 715, 719
(W. Va. 1968).
66 Davis Trust Co. v. Elkins, 114 W. Va. 742, 747, 157 S.E. 611, 614

(1934).
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The significance of the principal case in regard to West Virginia
property law is not one of minor potentialities. Interpretations by the
lawyers and courts of our state concerning the ramifications of this
case could have a profound effect upon the nature of future interests,
and particularly contingent remainders. Upon a consideration of
such interpretative possibilities, one tends to search for a concurring
or dissenting opinion which is conspicuously absent.
F. RichardHall

Income Tax-The Deductibility of Meals as Traveling Expenses
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of United
States v. Correll' ostensibly settled the long standing confusion as to
the permissible scope of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
That section provides that a taxpayer may deduct the ordinary and
necessary traveling expenses he incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on his trade or business. Included in this deduction is the
entire amount spent for meals and lodging while away from home.2
The Court elected to examine, in the light of the existing conflicts
among the United States Courts of Appeals,3 the Commissioner's
interpretation of section 162. Specifically, the question presented was
whether the Commissioner's position on that part of section 162
which provides for the deductibility of meals "while away from home"
was justified. Originally the Commissioner ruled that a taxpayer
could not deduct expenses for meals under section 162 unless such
expenses were incident to travel away from home "overnight." 4
Subsequently this overnight requirement was modified by the Commissioner's acquiescence to the decision of the Fifth Circuit in
Williams v. Patterson.6 In that case the taxpayer did not stay away
from home overnight but rather rented a hotel room where he simply
rested prior to returning to work. As a result of the Williams decision
1 20 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d Para. 675845 (1967).
INT. BEv. CODE of 1954, § 162 (a)2.
3 The First Circuit in Comm'r v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir.
1967), upheld the Commissioner's interpretation that the taxpayer's meals
were not deductible under section 162 unless his business travel was such
that he was required to stop for rest or sleep. Contra, Hanson v. Comm'r,
298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
4 Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949); Allan L. Hanson, 35 T.C. 413,
rev'd, Hanson v. Commr, 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
5 Rev. Rul. 221, 1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 34.
6 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
2
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